Regulation (EU) 2024/3015 lays down rules prohibiting economic operators from placing, making available on, or exporting from the EU market products produced by forced labour.
The stated objective is to improve the functioning of the internal market – and thus prevent unfair competition linked to social dumping – as well as to contribute to the fight against forced labour.
The analysis of the provision instead shows a series of inconsistencies that appear functional to preserve the impunity of Corporations for violations of fundamental human rights in supply chains.
1) Ban on the sale in the EU of products produced with forced labor
‘Economic operators shall not place or make available on the Union market products obtained by forced labour or export such products‘ (Article 3).
‘Products offered for sale online or through other distance selling channels are considered available on the market if the offer is intended for end users in the Union‘.
The prohibition therefore applies eachsometimes ‘the economic operator concerned directs, by any means, its activities towards a Member State‘ (Article 4).
2) Competent authorities, cooperation
By 14 December 2025 Member States shall provide the Commission and the other Member States, through the specific information and communication system established by the Regulation:
– the names, addresses and contact details of the competent authority or authorities designated by them to fulfil the obligations laid down in the Regulation; and
– the areas of competence of the competent authority or authorities.
Member States also ensure that their competent authorities:
– ‘exercise their powers impartially, transparently and with due respect for the obligations of professional secrecy‘;
– ‘have the necessary powers, expertise and resources to conduct investigations, including sufficient budgetary resources‘;
– ‘coordinate closely and exchange information with the competent national authorities, such as labour inspectorates and judicial and law enforcement authorities, including those responsible for combating trafficking in human beings, and with the authorities designated by Member States pursuant to Directive (EU) 2019/1937‘;
– have the power to impose sanctions ‘directly, in collaboration with other authorities, or by contacting the competent judicial authorities‘.
‘The competent authorities of the Member States and the Commission work in close cooperation and are responsible for ensuring the effective and uniform application of this Regulation throughout the Union.'(Article 5).
3) Governance
The EU network against products of forced labour – composed of representatives of each Member State, the Commission and, where appropriate, representatives of the customs authorities – serves as a platform for coordination and cooperation between the competent authorities of the Member States and the Commission.
The network carries out the following tasks, to achieve the objectives of the Regulation and contribute to its implementation:
– identify common priorities, facilitate the coordination of investigations, follow up on the implementation of decisions;
– at the request of the Commission, contribute to the development of guidelines for the application of the Regulation;
– facilitate and coordinate the collection and exchange of information, expertise and best practices;
– contribute to risk-based approaches and uniform administrative practices for the implementation of the Regulation;
– promote best practices in the application of the sanctions established by the Regulation;
– cooperate, where appropriate, with Commission services as well as EU bodies, offices and agencies and Member State authorities;
– ‘promote cooperation, staff exchanges and visit programmes between competent authorities and customs authorities, as well as between those competent authorities and the competent authorities of third countries and international organisations’;
– facilitate the organisation of training activities and the development of procedures and infrastructures, including in Union delegations in third countries;
– upon request of the Commission, provide assistance to the Commission in developing a coordinated approach to engagement and cooperation with third countries;
– monitor situations of systematic use of forced labor;
– assist in organizing information and awareness campaigns;
– promote and facilitate collaboration to explore the possibilities of using new technologies and product traceability; (2)
– collect data on corrective measures related to decisions and on the evaluation of their effectiveness.
3.1) Information and communication system
A system of information and communication between the Commission, the competent authorities of the Member States and the customs authorities is established pursuant to Article 34 of Regulation (EC) 1019/2019 (Article 7).
This system may be interconnected with that of the EU Single Window for Customs, pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2022/2399, for the exchange of requests and notifications between customs authorities and competent authorities.
3.2) Database of areas or products at risk of forced labor
A database is established by the European Commission to:
– provide indicative information on verifiable and regularly updated evidence on the risks of forced labour (including that imposed by state authorities) in specific geographical areas or in relation to specific products or groups of products, including with regard to forced labour;
– collect, in particular, independent and verifiable information coming from international organizations such as the ILO (International Labor Office) and the United Nations, or from institutional, academic or research organizations.
– identify as a matter of priority widespread and serious risks of forced labour;
– make easily accessible to the public, ‘also to people with disabilities’, the above information in all official languages of the institutions of the Union by 14 June 2026 (Article 8).
The European legislator, however, takes care to exclude from the public domain the names of the individual operators involved, in antithesis to the ‘name and shake’ principle which should instead logically apply.
3.3) Single point for submitting reports
Any people physical or legal person and any association, even without legal personality, may submit information on products suspected of being derived from slavery. With the possibility of providing information on economic operators or products suspected, the reasons and evidence, and any documents. Under conditions of confidentiality, unless otherwise agreed (articles 9,32).
A unique point for the presentation of information, available free of charge in all official languages of the EU institutions and easy to use, will be prepared by the European Commission. Which – excluding the information ‘manifestly incomplete or unfounded or presented in bad faith’ – distributes them to the competent lead authority according to the investigation allocation criterion.
The lead competent authority in charge of the investigation confirms receipt of the transmission, evaluates the information diligently and impartially, and informs the natural or legal person or association concerned of the outcome of the evaluation as soon as possible (Article 9).
3.4) Support measures for small and medium-sized enterprises
Accompanying measures will be developed by the European Commission to support the efforts of economic operators and their business partners, with particular regard to SMEs (Small and Medium Enterprises). These measures will be made public, where appropriate, through the ‘Single Portal on Forced Labour’.
The competent authorities designate contact points to provide information and assistance to SMEs on issues relating to the application of the Regulation. With the possibility of organising specific training on the risk indicators of forced labour and on how to engage in dialogue with the authorities themselves during an investigation (Article 10).
3.5) Guidelines
Guidelines for the application of the Regulation will be prepared by the Commission – in consultation with stakeholders – by 14 June 2026, and updated regularly. The guidelines include indications on:
– due diligence on economic operators ‘in relation to forced labour, including forced child labour‘. A significant limitation with respect to child exploitation as a whole, which in turn is incompatible with the ‘United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (1989). (3) Also taking into account the size and economic resources of economic operators, the different types of suppliers and the different sectors;
– best practices that economic operators should adopt to end and remedy different types of forced labour; due diligence on forced labour imposed by state authorities; information to be submitted to the competent authorities in case of investigations;
– benchmarks of the competent authorities for risk-based assessments in the context of investigations, and the evidence;
– additional information required for the import of products identified by the European Commission as ‘at risk of slavery’, pursuant to the subsequent article 27;
– forced labour risk indicators and how to identify such indicators, based on independent and verifiable information. Including reports from international organisations (e.g. ILO), representatives of civil society and business and trade union organisations, and experience gained on forced labour due diligence;
– method of calculating the financial penalties applicable by the Member States;
– methods of submitting reports (Article 11).
3.6) Single portal on forced labor
A unique portal on forced labour, by the Commission, makes available to the public in all official languages of the EU institutions:
– references of the competent authorities;
– guidelines and database;
– list of relevant information sources, with disaggregated data on the impact and victims of forced labour (e.g. age, gender);
– the single point for submitting reports;
– any decisions to ban a product;
– any revocations of bans;
– results of the reviews (Article 12).
3.7) International cooperation
International cooperation – with authorities of third countries, international organisations, representatives of civil society, trade unions and business organisations and other stakeholders, to facilitate the application of the regulation – is foreseen as optional, for the European Commission.
The exchange of information and cooperation on sectors or products at risk of forced labour, best practices to end forced labour, decisions to ban products (and related evidence), are foreseen in particular with third countries having similar legislation.
Cooperation initiatives and accompanying measures – to support the efforts of economic operators and SMEs, civil society organisations, social partners and third countries, to tackle forced labour and its root causes – may be taken ‘into consideration’ by the Commission and EU Member States (Article 13).
4) Investigations
The evaluation of the likelihood that a product offered on the EU market has been produced by forced labour or slavery follows a risk-based approach. The Commission and the competent authorities of the Member States, ‘to give priority to products suspected of having been produced with forced labor’, can therefore refer to the following criteria:
– the extent and severity of the alleged forced labor, including where imposed by the State;
– quantity of products placed or made available on the EU market;
– percentage of the part of the product suspected to have been produced with forced labor compared to the final product.
The preliminary investigation focuses on economic operators and product suppliers involved in their supply chains’as close as possible to where the risk of forced labour is likely to exist and which can exert the greatest influence in preventing, mitigating and terminating the use of forced labour’ (Article 14). An antinomy, where the maximum influence on working conditions can be exercised by the Corporations that purchase the products (eg cocoa, hazelnuts, palm oil) and not by their local suppliers.
4.1) Coordination of investigations and mutual assistance
The investigations are coordinated by a lead competent authority, which may be:
– the European Commission, if the alleged forced labour takes place outside the EU territory;
– the competent authority of the Member State concerned, if the alleged forced labour takes place on its territory (Article 15).
Mutual assistance is also provided, upon request of the lead authority, for the exchange of information and contacts with economic operators having their headquarters or operating language in other Member States (Article 16).
4.2) Pre-investigation
Before starting an investigation, ‘The lead competent authorities shall request information from the economic operators undergoing assessment and, where applicable, from suppliers of products, on the relevant measures taken by them to identify, prevent, tone down, to eliminate or remedy the risks of forced labor’.
Economic operators have 30 days to respond, with the right to submit documents and request assistance from the national contact point. Within 30 working days of the response, ‘the lead competent authority concludes the preliminary phase of the investigation aimed at establishing whether there is a well-founded suspicion of infringement’.
The pre-investigation can be closed, please note, even when ‘ the reasons which gave rise to the reasonable suspicion have been eliminated, for example by virtue of an application of the applicable legislation, guidelines, recommendations or any other duty of care in relation to forced labour (…) which mitigates, prevents and ends the risk of forced labour'(Article 17).
4.3) Investigation
If the lead authority establishes the existence of a well-founded suspicion of a violation of the general ban on placing products obtained from forced labour in the EU, it:
– initiate an investigation into the products and economic operators concerned, informing them (within three working days of the date of the decision) of the initiation of the investigation and its possible consequences; the products under investigation; the reasons for initiating the investigation, unless this would jeopardise its outcome; the right and the date by which documents or information may be submitted;
– communicates the start of the investigation in the information and communication system (see previous paragraph 3.1);
At the request of the lead competent authority, the economic operators under investigation transmit all useful information also for traceability purposes’ and, if applicable, the parts of the product to which the investigation should be limited'(Article 18).
4.4) De-territorialization
Again, as already highlighted in the last paragraph of the previous paragraph 4, the European legislator provides that the lead authority, ‘to the extent possible’:
– say ‘priority to the economic operators under investigation involved in the stages of the supply chain as close as possible to where the probable forced labour takes place‘;
– take into account ‘of the size and economic resources of the economic operators, in particular if the economic operator is an SME, of the quantity of products concerned, of the supply chain complexity‘ (Article 18).
The European legislator tends to distance the investigation from the protagonists of the value chain, in clear contradiction with the objectives declared in the regulation. This approach serves to protect Corporations whose strategy is based precisely on the de-territorialization of the supply chains. (4)
4.5) On-site inspections
Only ‘in exceptional situations where the lead competent authority deems it necessary to carry out on-site inspections’, it provides ‘taking into account the location where the risk of forced labor is located‘.
On-site inspections – which should be mandatory, in application of the regulations for the protection of workers, on European territory – are indicated as optional, like those in non-EU countries.
When the risk of forced labour is located outside the territory of the Union, moreover, the power of on-site inspections by the Commission is entrusted:
– not only, as is logical, to the official information and the absence of objections by the government of the third country where the inspections are expected to take place. But also
– at the ‘provided that the economic operators concerned give their consent’ (Article 19). Another rule tailor-made for Corporations, who are certainly not interested in official inspections on ‘land grabbing’ and slavery.
5) Decisions
Within a period within a reasonable time (not exceeding 9 months) from the start of the investigation, the lead competent authority shall evaluate all the information and evidence collected. Or any other available data, in case of failure to collect data also due to unjustified failures to provide feedback by operators. To establish whether the products concerned have been placed or made available on the market or exported in violation of the prohibition referred to in Article 3. In such a case, the authority may order:
– a ban on placing or making available on the EU market the products concerned and on exporting them;
– ordering the investigated economic operators to withdraw from the EU market the products concerned already placed on the Union market, and/or to remove from an online interface the related content and advertisements;
– the requirement for the operators under investigation to dispose of the products in question (or their respective parts, if it is ascertained that only the parts obtained from forced labor are replaceable) without even considering the logical alternative of allocating such goods to charitable organizations.
Where instead, the authority is unable to establish that the products concerned have been placed or made available on the market or are exported in violation of Article 3, it shall close the investigation and inform both the economic operators involved and all other competent authorities (through the information and communication system). The closure of the investigation does not preclude the initiation of a new investigation on the same product and the same economic operator if new relevant information emerges.'(Article 20).
5.1) Exemptions
The disposal order above, in case of ascertainment of violations of the general rule set out in Article 3, it may be derogated ‘in order to prevent disruptions to a [not better defined, ed.] supply chain of strategic or critical importance for the Union’.
Alternatively to the disposal order, the lead competent authority may ‘order that the product concerned be retained, at the expense of the economic operators, for a specified period of time, which shall not exceed the time necessary to eliminate forced labour in relation to the product in question.
If economic operators demonstrate, during that period of time, that they have eliminated forced labour from the supply chain in respect of the products concerned, without modifying the product concerned, and having put an end to the forced labour identified (…), the lead competent authority shall review its decision'(Article 20).
5.2) Implementation of decisions
‘The decisions adopted by a competent authority of a Member State shall be recognised and applied by the competent authorities of the other Member States insofar as they concern products with the same identification information and originating from the same supply chain for which the use of forced labour has been established‘ (Article 20).
5.3) Review of decisions
Review of decisions may be requested ‘at any time’ by the economic operators concerned. The request for review contains ‘substantial new information which was not brought to the attention of the lead competent authority during the investigation’ and demonstrates that the products are placed or made available on the market or intended for export in accordance with Article 3.
The decision on the request for review must be adopted within the strict deadline of 30 working days from its receipt. Immediately – through implementing acts of the Commission, when it acts as lead competent authority – ‘for duly justified imperative grounds of urgency relating to the protection of the rights of defence and property of the economic operators concerned‘.
The procedural and substantive legality of the decision of the lead competent authority of a Member State may in any case be submitted to the review of a competent judicial body by the economic operators concerned (Article 21).
5.4) Tabula rasa
‘Where reference economic operators have demonstrated that they have complied with the Decision (…) and that they have eliminated forced labour from their activities or from their supply chain in relation to the products concerned’:
– ‘the lead competent authority revokes its decision for the future, informs the economic operators and removes the decision from the single portal on forced labor‘; and yet
– remain ‘without prejudice to jurisdictional decisions taken by national courts of the Member States with respect to the same economic operators or products‘ (Article 21).
6) Role of customs authorities
The products entering or leaving the EU market are subject to controls by the customs authorities, who in turn are required to:
– execute the decisions of the competent lead authority of ‘prohibit the placing or making available of products on the Union market and their export’ (Article 26);
– request from economic operators additional information on the products or groups of products identified by the Commission as ‘at risk of forced labor’ (Article 27);
– authorise release for free circulation or export if the competent authority does not confirm the suspension within 4 days (2 for perishable products. Article 29);
– seize products whose release for free circulation or export has been refused by the competent authority (Article 30).
7) Moderate sanctions
It is responsibility of the Member States to establish – and notify to the Commission, by 14 December 2026 – penalties ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’. The determination of which by the competent authorities must take due account, as appropriate, of:
– the seriousness and duration of the economic operator’s failure to comply with a decision, as well as any previous failures;
– degree of cooperation with the competent authorities;
– any mitigating or aggravating circumstances (e.g. financial benefits, profits gained or losses avoided, directly or indirectly, as a consequence of non-compliance with a decision. Article 37).
It is observed however that:
– the sanctions are not related to the seriousness of the placing on the EU market of products obtained from forced labour, but only to the failure to comply with the decisions of the competent authority;
– the ‘dissuasiveness’ of the sanctions is not accompanied by a reference to a percentage of the turnover of the responsible operator and of the Corporation to which it may belong. (5)
8) Provisional conclusions
Forced Labour Regulation (EU) No 2024/3015, FLR, reveals a bitter truth:
– slavery and abuse of workers, even minors, still constitute a strategic asset (6) for the financial oligarchies that dominate the planet, through control (7,8). To the point that
– the Trans-National Corporations have thus obtained a completely harmless EU regulation. Just as, at the United Nations level, they have succeeded in nullifying the #BindingTreaty. (4)
The emptiness of the regulation under examination is evident from various aspects, such as:
– the absence of due diligence requirements;
– the focus of controls on those who perform rather than those who profit most from forced labor;
– the possibility of evading investigations with indefinite commitments, decisions with equally indefinite ‘demonstrations’;
– the requirement of ‘consent of the suspect’ to on-site inspections in third countries;
– penalties not linked to turnover;
– the absence of references to the responsibilities of corporate groups.
The only true intent of the European legislator, equally easy to glimpse, is to attribute to the European Commission the power to hinder the imports of products arriving from countries not aligned with the geopolitics of the collective West, on the basis of relationships built ad hoc.
#Égalité
Dario Dongo
Credit cover: The workers’ rights. Mars Chocolate Child Labor Controversy: Company Use Kids As Young As 5. December 2, 2023 https://tinyurl.com/p8mp4sjs
Footnote
(1) Regulation (EU) 2024/3015 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2024 on prohibiting products made with forced labor on the Union market and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 https://tinyurl.com/t8t9x79e
(2) See the example of the Swiss startup KOA, in paragraph 3 of the previous article by Dario Dongo. Chocolate from the whole cocoa fruit, with no added sugars. FT (Food Times). September 13, 2024
(3) Dario Dongo. UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, 30 years without a solution. Egalité. 17.11.19
(4) See paragraph 3 of the previous article by Dario Dongo. Responsibilities of Trans-National Corporations, #BindingTreaty. FT (Food Times). December 17, 2024
(5) Financial sanctions of a percentage value on the turnover of the previous financial year are instead established in various other European legislative acts, among which:
– the Omnibus and Due Diligence Directives
– the GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation), GPSR (General Product Safety Regulation), EUDR (European Union Deforestation Regulation) Regulations
(6) Human rights, not by chance, are the missing piece of the greenwashing operations of Corporations. See the previous article by Marta Strinati, Dario Dongo. Palm oil, soy, wood, coffee, cocoa. What is sustainability certification for? Greenpeace report. GIFT (Great Italian Food Trade).
(7) Dario Dongo. The tentacles of finance on food sovereignty and our food. FT (Food Times). March 31, 2024
(8) Dario Dongo. The warlords in the European elections. Égalité. April 2, 2024
Dario Dongo, lawyer and journalist, PhD in international food law, founder of WIISE (FARE - GIFT - Food Times) and Égalité.
 2024/3015 shows a series of inconsistencies that appear functional to preserve the impunity of Corporations for violations of fundamental human rights in supply chains.){kind=link}